Offer silence and contractual agreement. / Austen Baker, Richard. N2 – This article discusses the mechanics of acceptance in contract law and focuses on whether a bidder`s silence can prevail. He found the rule in Felthouse v Bindley (1862) alive and good, but created problems for judges who were anxious to find arrangements. The article examines the existence of a “speech obligation,” as is sometimes proposed, and rejects this obligation, along with all other so-called exceptions to the rule, and concludes that silence cannot be accepted, but that behaviour may do so, unless a bidder “speaks” to contradict the inevitable conclusions of the conduct. The article also argues that acceptance as such is not necessary for an agreement, but that notification of apparent acceptance is the necessary element which, with an offer, constitutes an agreement. If the party that is silent acts tacitly on the agreement, silence is treated as an acceptance. In the case of an unsolicited commodity, if the potential buyer uses the goods, the buyer has accepted the contract. Suppose A sends B some food and A informs B that A is waiting for payment. If B eats, B has accepted the agreement.
Felthouse v Bindley (1862) EWHC CP J 35, is the main case of contract law law in English on the rule that one cannot impose on another person the obligation to refuse his offer. This is sometimes deceptively expressed in a rule that “silence cannot be reduced to acceptance.” Second, silence is the assumption that the bidder informed the bidder that silence would constitute acceptance. For example, the court ruled that Felthouse was not in possession of the horse, as there was no acceptance of the contract. Acceptance must be clearly communicated and cannot be imposed by the silence of one of the parties. The uncle was not allowed to impose a sale by silence, which would only cause the contract to fail by rejection. Although the nephew expressed interest in closing the sale, there was no notification of this intention until after the sale of the horse at an auction on February 25. The nephew`s february 27 letter, which had been presented as evidence by felthouse, was considered to be the first case of communication in which acceptance was notified to the supplier (Felthouse). And by that time, the horse was already sold. As a result, Felthouse was not interested in the property.
Yes, but only in some cases. In order for silence to be considered an acceptance, there are usually some cases between the two parties and that it is customary for both parties to treat silence as a hypothesis. Fourth, the late acceptance of an offer has the legal weight of a counter-offer. In other words, when a bidder makes an offer to a bidder and the bidder accepts it inappropriately, that presumption is not valid. An agreement on the terms of an offer becomes a binding contract that can only be applied if that offer has been accepted. This exercise note examines what can be summed up in acceptance, how it can be communicated and when it can be withdrawn. The general rule is that silence is not an acceptance. See McGlone v.
Lacey, 288 F.Supp 662 (D.S.D. 1968). However, there are four important exceptions to this general rule. The Dominion`s incorrect practice: Where the bidder treats goods improperly, as if they were his own, without first accepting an offer to buy them. If someone makes you an offer and you don`t respond, you`re not normally bound by a contract. Your silence is generally not considered a guess if you don`t really intend to accept it.